Autonomous aerial vehicles play an important role in military applications such as in search, surveillance and reconnaissance. Multi-player stochastic pursuit-evasion (PE) differential game is a natural model for such operations involving intelligent moving targets with uncertainties. In this paper, some fundamental issues of stochastic PE games are addressed. We first model a general stochastic multi-player PE differential game with perfect state information. To avoid the difficulty of multiplicity of the players, we extend the iterative method for deterministic multi-player PE games to the stochastic case. Starting from certain suboptimal solutions with an improving property, the optimization based on limited look-ahead can be used for improvement. The process converges when this improvement is applied iteratively. Furthermore, we introduce a hierarchical approach that can determine a valid starting point of the iterative process. As a basis for multi-player games, stochastic two-player PE games are also addressed. We also briefly discuss the games with imperfect state information and propose a suboptimal approach from a practical point of view. Finally, we demonstrate the usefulness and the feasibility of the method through simulations.
INTRODUCTION
Autonomous aerial vehicles (AAVs) have shown great potential value in reducing human workload in future military operations. Co-operation among multiple AAVs is a key factor. Important applications such as intelligent search, co-operative surveillance and reconnaissance of potential threats, and persistent area denial have drawn much attention [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . Usually, the feasibility of the limited look-ahead method are demonstrated through two selected stochastic PE scenarios. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
STOCHASTIC GAME FORMULATION
Consider a general PE differential game with N pursuers and M evaders in a n 0 dimensional space S R The dynamics of pursuer i and evader j are described by (1) , where for simplicity, we use the subscript t to represent time. [14] . The additive disturbance in this model is used mainly for mathematical convenience; however, in practice, it may stand for the pursuers' ignorance of the evaders' motions [6] or the disturbance on the movement of small AAVs, e.g. random wind effects.
For pursuer i; define the projection operator P : R In a multi-player PE game, the evaders are generally not captured simultaneously. A game terminates when all the evaders are captured, and the terminal time, T; can be defined as T ¼ max j fT j g:
We use a discrete vector, z 2 Z M ¼ Z Á Z Á Á Á Z with Z ¼ f0; 1g; as additional states to indicate whether evader j ( j ¼ 1; . . . ; M) is captured. Here, the jth element of vector z; z j ¼ 1 if evader j is not captured while z j ¼ 0 if it is captured. According to the definition of the capture of an evader, z j is governed by function g j :Z Â X ! Z that is defined as Here, x is the aggregate state including all x i p and x j e and X is the set of all possible x's, which will be defined shortly.
Assumption 1
Every pursuer can proceed to other evaders after it captures an evader; while every evader stops moving when it is captured.
With Assumption 1, the dynamics of evader j in (1) 
Here, zðt þ Þ and zðt À Þ denote the right and the left limit of z at time t:
Definition 1 Let ðO; F; PÞ be a probability space, fF t g a monotone family of s-fields F t F with F t 1 F t 2 for any t 0 4t 1 4t 2 ; and X a complete separable metric space. A stochastic process x defined on the time interval ½t 0 ; T; } xðtÞ : O ! X with t 0 4t4T; is said to be fF t g t5t 0 -progressively measurable if for all t 2 ½t 0 ; T; the map ðt; oÞ/xðt; oÞ is B½t 0 ; t Â F t =BðXÞ measurable, where B½t 0 ; t is the Borel s-field on ½t 0 ; t and BðXÞ is the Borel s-field on X(cf. [14] ).
The sample space for the stochastic process in (2) (2) . Similarly, for t4s4T; define Information pattern in games is crucial to the players, especially in a stochastic game. In a PE game, the simplest case is that both pursuers and evaders can access the state variables perfectly, in which case a value function can be well defined. Situations become much more difficult when the players' measurements are noisy and distinct, and in such cases the existence of solutions can be problematic. In this paper, we focus on problems with perfect state information; and the imperfect state information case is briefly discussed. Readers can refer to [15, 16] for more discussion on information patterns in stochastic games with imperfect state information.
In a stochastic PE game, suppose that the players can measure the state perfectly. k We consider the following objective functional: [14] . Here, E o;t denotes the expectation taken with respect to the stochastic process o starting from t: Henceforth, we will use E o for an abbreviated notation. An admissible control of the pursuers and that of the evaders, aðÁÞ and bðÁÞ are defined, respectively, as aðÁÞ 2 AðtÞ ¼ 4 ff : ½t; T/A a jfðÁÞ is F t;s -progressively measurableg bðÁÞ 2 BðtÞ ¼ 4 fj : ½t; T/B a jjðÁÞ is F t;s -progressively measurableg for t4s4T: We say that aðÁÞ; * aðÁÞ 2 AðtÞ are the same on interval ½t; s; denoted by a % * a on ½t; s; if the probability P o t ða ¼ * a a:e: in ½t; sÞ ¼ 1: The same holds for bðÁÞ; * bðÁÞ 2 BðtÞ: Before defining the value function, we first define a strategy of the pursuers at time t5t 0 as a map a : BðtÞ/AðtÞ; where the pursuers' control is a function of the input that evaders exploit. Similarly, the evaders' strategy b can be defined as b : AðtÞ/BðtÞ: Definition 2 A non-anticipative strategy a (or b) of the pursuers (or evaders) on ½t; T is a 2 GðtÞ ¼ 4 fa : BðtÞ/AðtÞj for any bðÁÞ; * bðÁÞ 2 BðtÞ; b % * b on ½t; s implies a½b % a½ * b on½t; s for every s 2 ½t; T g ðor b 2 DðtÞ ¼ 4 fb : AðtÞ/BðtÞj for any aðÁÞ; * aðÁÞ 2 AðtÞ; a % * a on ½t; s non-anticipative strategy, the stochastic differential equation (2) has a unique solution [14] . More details about the formulation of a stochastic game problem can be found in [9, 17, 18] . A stochastic PE game is formulated as a zero-sum game. For any x 2 X and z 2 Z M ; the lower value of a game Vðx; zÞ is defined as It turns out that in (5), pursuers have an informational advantage and similarly for evaders in (6) . In general, Vðx; zÞ4Vðx; zÞ [19, p. 434] , and if Vðx; zÞ ¼ Vðx; zÞ; we say that value of the game (saddle-point equilibrium) exists, which is denoted by Vðx; zÞ:** This is called the Isaacs condition. With these definitions, optimality of solutions can be interpreted according to V; V or V: Without assuming the Isaacs condition, our study is focused on the upper value defined in (6) .
yy Hereafter, we use the capitalized 'Value' to stand for the (lower/upper) Value functions of a multi-player game.
SOLUTION TECHNIQUES

Difficulty of conventional differential game theory
Dynamic programming (DP) is a general method for solving stochastic differential games, in which the underlying idea is the state rollback, i.e. an optimal state trajectory is traced backwards starting from certain terminal state. Specifically, the Value function is characterized by a Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) equation, and initial conditions on terminal states are generally needed. In contrast to a two-player PE game, in a multi-player game, if pursuer i catches evader j; we say that both players are engaged. Clearly, the possible terminal states depend on a specific engagement between the pursuers and the evaders, which are hard to be specified when N and M are large. Furthermore, the treatment by the corresponding HJI equation for a multi-player game becomes more difficult because the additional discrete state z is involved. In general, DP approaches cannot be directly applied to multi-player PE games [13] .
An iterative method based on a suboptimal solution
As in deterministic PE games [13] , we start with a class of suboptimal methods, where an additional structure S is imposed on the pursuers' controls. Given any states x 2 X and z 2 Z M ;
we denote by A S x;z ðtÞ a non-empty 'structured' control set of the pursuers, and A S x;z ðtÞ AðtÞ: Here, the superscript and the subscript in A S x;z indicate the dependence on the structure S and on the states x and z: Suppose that for any x 2 X; z 2 Z M at time t5t 0 ; problem (6) ðsÞ determined at time s associated with * x s and * z s : Clearly, if structure S is independent of the state x; z and time t; it is SST-consistent.
Theorem 1
Under an SST-consistent control structure S; function f Vðx; zÞ in (7) satisfies (8) for any x 2 X; z 2 Z M with any Dt > 0 under (2) with (3). (2) and (3). Then, a sequence of functions W k can be generated by W kþ1 ¼ H½W k starting from some W 0 2 W: The following theorem shows that the sequence converges if (7) that results from 'structured' controls of SSTC can be improved iteratively by the optimization based on limited look-ahead. The limit of this process W 1 is the best upper bound of V that can be approached by this scheme. Then, a natural question is that whether W 1 is the true upper Value, which needs further investigation. The starting point can be [13, 14, 18] .
The hierarchical (structured) suboptimal method
With the iterative method, a multi-player game reduces to finding a valid suboptimal upper Value function with the improving property in (8) . In what follows, we will briefly introduce a hierarchical decomposition method [4, 13] that can determine a valid starting point for the iterative process. To illustrate the idea, we consider a class of games with the following objective functional }} and the players' dynamics in (2) with (3).
Jða; b; x; zÞ ¼
The objective in (10) stands for the sum of the capture time of each evader. There are two levels in the hierarchical approach: the upper level is to determine a proper engagement scheme between the pursuers and the evaders, such that a multi-player PE game can be decomposed into distributed two-player PE games; at the lower level, the decoupled two-player games are solved [4] . The basic assumption of this approach is that the underlying two-player stochastic PE games are solvable, i.e. the upper Value V i j j ðx i j jÞ of the two-player game between any evader j and its engaged pursuer i j may be solved and is available to the upper level, where x i j j ¼ 4 ½x
By (10), the objective functional for a decoupled two-player game is the expected capture time, i.e. J ¼ Ef R dtg: Suppose that M4N and each evader (pursuer) can be engaged with no more than one pursuer (evader). Assume that there exists an engagement scheme E such that V i j j ðx i j j Þ51 for the game between any evader j and its engaged pursuer i j : Then, a combinatorial optimization problem to determine an optimal engagement between the pursuers and the evaders at the upper level can be formulated as
In (11), the superscript h in f V h indicates that it is determined by the hierarchical approach; the assignment variables s ij 's are binary, where s ij ¼ 1 indicates that pursuer i is engaged with evader j and s ij ¼ 0 if it is not. The hierarchical method is a natural way of dealing with multiplicity of the players, in which there is an additional hierarchical structure that is imposed on pursuers' controls, and thus V4 f V h : It is also worth noting that the (best) strategy of the evaders determined 'locally' at the lower level against their engaged pursuers is optimal with respect to (7) if each evader can only be captured by its engaged pursuer. More importantly, the hierarchical approach is SSTconsistent because the 'structure' (the set of possible engagements between the pursuers and the 'alive' evaders) remains the same for any state x and time t given any z 2 Z M : Therefore, f V h is a valid starting point for the iterative method.
Problem (11) is formulated for the case M4N: If M > N; some pursuer i must be engaged with more than one evader, and pursuer i proceeds to them sequentially. In this case, the (assignment) problem becomes a multi-stage allocation problem where each stage is associated with one engaged evader for pursuer i: Denote by j In summary, we show that given a proper suboptimal solution to a stochastic multi-player PE game, the optimization based on limited look-ahead can be used to improve the solution iteratively. It should be noted that this method is closely related to DP methods, and it suffers the curse of dimensionality. Thus, scalability is an issue when the dimension of the states or the number of the players is large. Practical algorithms still need to be further investigated. To this end, those numerical methods for solving DP equations, which have been extensively studied [24] [25] [26] [27] , may benefit the implementation of the iterative method. On the other hand, despite lack of efficient algorithms, the iterative method still has its practical value in performance enhancement. The iterative process may stop at any step to provide the best suboptimal solution to date due to the monotonicity. In practice, this method can provide a satisfactory solution based on a carefully chosen cost-to-go function. We will later demonstrate the usefulness of this method through simulations.
Solution to a two-player pursuit-evasion game
Under the framework of the iterative method with the hierarchical approach, solution to two-player games becomes a basis for multi-player games. In this section, we present kk In this case, the improving property in (8) the results on two-player games based on stochastic differential game (optimal control) theory.
3.4.1. Preliminary: Stochastic differential game theory. For the reader's convenience, we first briefly review stochastic differential game theory based on [17] . Consider the following players' dynamic equation:
Here, x 2 R n ; a t 2 A a and b t 2 B a are the controls of player 1 (minimizer) and player 2 (maximizer), where A a and B a are compact sets; o is a standard Wiener process with proper dimension. Let the objective functional be
/R represents the cost rate; Q : R n /R is the terminal cost; T is exit time, which is defined as T ¼ minftjðt;
n is open and T ¼ ½0; T R: The non-anticipative strategies of player 1 and 2 are denoted by a 2 GðtÞ and b 2 DðtÞ; respectively. Let C 2 ðXÞ be the set of functions with continuous secondorder derivatives on X: Denote by C 1;2 ðQÞ the set of functions fðt; xÞ that have continuous firstand second-order partial derivatives, f t ; f x and f xx : Henceforth, we use C 2 and C 1;2 for simplicity. Define CðXÞ ¼ 4 fc : X/Rjc is measurable on X and boundedg: Denote by Pðs; x s ; t; x t Þ the transition probability density of x t 2 X at t given the state x s at time s with s5t: For any c 2 CðXÞ; define operator S s;t as
cðxÞPðs; x s ; t; xÞ dx Define the operator XðtÞ on CðXÞ as
For the stochastic process x t defined in (12) , which is a diffusion process [17] , XðtÞ is a secondorder partial differential operator on C 2 ; i.e.
Here, trðMÞ denotes the trace of a square matrix M: Consider any function fðt; xÞ 2 C 1;2 and by Ito's differential rule [17, 18] ,
Lemma 3
Assume that (i) functions f and s in (12) satisfy that jj f ðt; x; a; bÞjj4Cð1 þ jjxjjÞ and jjsðxÞjj4Cð1 þ jjxjjÞ for some constant C > 0; any x 2 X; a 2 A a and b 2 B a ;
(ii) Let function V 2 C 1;2 ; there exist constants D and k; such that jjVðt; xÞjj4Dð1 þ jjxjj k Þ for any ðt; xÞ 2 Q (iii) V is continuous on Q; the closure of Q; (iv) V t þ XðtÞV þ Gðt; xÞ50 for all ðt; xÞ 2 Q; where Ef R T s jGðt; x t Þj dtg51 for any ðs; x s Þ 2 Q and some function G : R Â R n /R: Then,
Refer to Theorem 5.1 on page 124 in [17] . & Denote by # V; # V and # V the upper, the lower and the Value of the game.
Theorem 4
Suppose that functions f ; s satisfy the conditions (i), and # V satisfies (ii) and (iii) in Lemma 3. Assume that there exists aðÁÞ 2 AðsÞ such that
for any ðs; x s Þ 2 Q and b 2 DðsÞ: Let # V be a solution of the following HJI equation:
for any ðt; x t Þ 2 Q with the boundary # VðT; x T Þ ¼ Qðx T Þ where ðT; x T Þ 2 @Q (the boundary of Q), such that # V 2 C 1;2 ðQÞ and continuous on Q (the closure). Then,
f # Jða; b½a; s; x s Þg for any aðÁÞ 2 AðsÞ and ðs; x s Þ 2 Q; (ii) if there exists a n ðÁÞ 2 AðsÞ such that a n t 2 A a for s4t5T and it satisfies max
for any ðt; x t Þ 2 Q; then # Vðs; x s Þ ¼ sup b2DðsÞ fĴða n ; b½a n ; s; x s Þg for any ðs; x s Þ 2 Q:
Proof
The theorem can be easily proved by extending Theorem 4.1 on page 159 in [17] . &
Remark 2
The conclusion in Theorem 4 can be extended to the lower Value # V if it satisfies conditions similar to (16) and (17) but with the order of 'minimization' and 'maximization' reversed, e.g.,
Furthermore, if the HJI equations (16) and (18) 
3.4.2. Solution to a two-player pursuit-evasion game. In this section, we introduce an analytic result for a specific two-player differential PE game. Consider the following dynamics of the players in R 2 :
This is a noise-corrupted version of the simplified Dubin's car model, where the subscript B 2 fp; eg stands for the pursuer or the evader; % 
where the constant
The proof is an application of Theorem 4. We need to show that V is both an upper and a lower Value function. Here, we only show that V is an upper Value, i.e. it satisfies the corresponding HJI equation as in (16) 
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Here, i ¼ 1; 2 (j ¼ 1; 2) stands for % x and % y; respectively. Substitute (19) into (21), and the terms D1 and D2 in (21) By inspection of (21)- (23), only the term D1 in (22) involves control y p and y e : Clearly,
On the other hand, D2 in (23) can be simplified as
By (24) and (25), min y p max y e fXðtÞVðx p ; x e Þ þ 1g ¼ 0: Thus, V is a solution of the HJI equation. Furthermore, it can be shown similarly that V is also a lower Value. Hence, V is a Value function. &
On finite expectation of the capture time.
In this section, we examine the condition EfTg51 in Theorem 5. Let us first consider a simplified game in a one-dimensional space as shown in Figure 1 .The dynamics of the players are described by
Here, B 2 fp; eg; v B is the velocity; u B 2 f1; À1g is the control variable; o B is a one-dimensional standard Wiener process. To force the capture, the pursuer must move towards the evader; while the evader escapes in the same direction, e.g. u p ¼ u e ¼ 1 as in Figure 1 . Let x ¼ x e À x p and the dynamic equation becomes
Lemma 6
For any l; 05l51 and k 2 Z 50 ; P 1 n¼1 n k l Àn 51:
Lemma 7
If v p > v e and e50; then EfTg51; where T ¼ 4 infftj jxðtÞj4eg:
Pursuer Evader 
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Proof
We first find an upper bound of PðT > tÞ; the probability that the evader has not been captured by time t: Without loss of generality, assume that the game starts at time 0 and xð0Þ > e: By the property of Wiener process, the state x t at time t > 0 is a Gaussian random variable, i.e. x t $ Nðm x t ; s 2 x t Þ: Here, the mean m x t ¼ xð0Þ þ vt and the variance is s
The fact that T > t implies that x t > e at least at time t: It satisfies
Define t 0 ¼ ðxð0Þ À eÞ=% v; * t ¼ t À t 0 and r ¼ x þ % v * t; such that
Choose some t 1 such that % vðt 1 À t 0 Þ > 1; and define t 2 ¼ maxf2t 0 ; t 1 g: Consider the time t when t > t 2 ; i.e. * t > t 0 and % v * t > 1; and then
Denote by p T ðtÞ the probability density of the capture time T: Then,
Next, we show that the second term on the right-hand side of (29) is finite, which implies that EfTg is finite. Choose a small dt > 0; and then
which is illustrated in Figure 2 . In (30), each term in the summation satisfies
Note that PðT > t 2 þ kdtÞ ¼ R 1 t 2 þkdt p T ðtÞ dt; and by (27) and (28),
Substitute (32) into (30), and by Lemma 6,
By (29) and (33), EfTg51: &
Remark 3
Although Lemma 7 can be proved in a simpler way, the proof presented here is useful in the following theorem for the game in R 2 :
Now, we examine the game in a R 2 space associated with Theorem 5. First of all, change the variables as * x ¼ % x p À % x e and * y ¼ % y p À % y e : According to (22) and (24), the optimal control of the pursuer coincides with that of the evader, namely, y n p ¼ y n e : Suppose that both the pursuer and the evader use the same control and denote it by y: Then the dynamic equation of the players becomes where dðÁÞ is Dirac-Delta function; f i is the ith element of function f in (34), i.e. i ¼ 1; 2 stand for * x and * y; respectively. Since the analytical solution of Equation (35) is formidable, in the following, we construct an upper bound of PðT > tÞ and verify it using numerical
N t T p T t
…... 0 t Figure 2 . The probability density of the capture time p T ðtÞ:
STOCHASTIC MULTI-PLAYER PURSUIT-EVASION DIFFERENTIAL GAMES 233 solution to (35). Note that PðT > tÞ4Pðrðx t Þ > eÞ; and the following discussion is focused on Pðrðx t Þ > eÞ:
To construct an upper bound of Pðrðx t Þ > eÞ; we first consider a simplified situation where the control y in (35) is fixed, i.e. y t ¼ y 0 for t50: Based on the property of Wiener process, the probability distribution under y 0 ; p x indicates the fixed control y 0 and the subscript x implies the x co-ordinates. Now, we change the co-ordinates by transformation G t at time t:
where b t is the angle between the 'line of sight'*** from the evader to the pursuer and the * x-axis, which is illustrated in Figure 3 .
In the new x 0 -y 0 co-ordinates, the state x 0 and y 0 are jointly Gaussian with the mean
and the covariance Cov t ; Thus, the random variables in the new x 0 -y 0 co-ordinates are independent, and the distribution p
Next, we change the x 0 -y 0 co-ordinates to a r-j (polar) co-ordinate system as
Here, /ð# x;x 0 Þ is the angle between the vectorx and the x 0 -axis and its range is ½0; 2pÞ: Denote this transformation by G t . At each # x; the absolute value of the Jacobian J
Clearly, p r;j ðt; r; jÞ5p r;j ðt; r; 0Þ for any j=0: Let % r m *
The probability that r > r (r50) under control y 0 at time t; P y 0 ðrð # x t Þ > rÞ satisfies
Next, we consider the case when both the pursuer and the evader exploit their optimal control y n determined in (30). Intuitively, the optimal control y n (in state feedback) drives each state ð * x; * yÞ towards the origin, such that it outperforms (static) y 0 in terms of capture. Similar to (40), we assume that Equation (41) 
Here, P y n ðrðx t Þ > rÞ is the probability of r > r under y n at time t: Due to the convexity of r ¼ ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
and by Jensen's inequality, is replaced by % r y n ; i.e.,
y n q along the trajectory under the optimal control y n : The evolution of r y n ðtÞ can be derived based on the Ito's rule. According to XðtÞ in (13), the evolution of r y n ðtÞ under the control y n satisfies
Here, ð@r y n ðtÞ=@ * xÞ cos y n þ ð@r y n ðtÞ=@* yÞ sin y n ¼ À1: Next, our study is focused on the set
> eg: Since e > s 2 =2v (cf. Theorem 5) and r y n > e; according to (43) ' r y n ðtÞ ¼ Àv þ 1 2r y n ðtÞ
It indicates that the decreasing rate of r at any point in S is greater than k 2 ; and thus the decreasing rate of % r y n ¼ 4 Efr y n ðxÞjr y n ðxÞ > eg; the expectation of r y n given r y n > e; is bigger than k 2 : Namely,
The inequality of (41) holds with % r y n ðtÞreplaced by r 0 Àk 2 t:
Theorem 8
In a PE game with the dynamics specified in (19) , if v p > v e ; e > ðs 2 p þ s 2 e Þ=2ðv p À v e Þ and the probability Pðrðx t Þ > eÞ under the optimal control y n satisfies (45), then EfTg51:
Choose some t 1 such that k 2 ðt 1 À t 0 Þ > 1 and let t 2 ¼ maxf2t 0 ; t 1 g: Consider that t > t 2 ; such that % t > t 0 and k 2 % t > 1: Then,
for any t50: The rest of the proof follows the proof of Lemma 7 from (29) . & Finally, we verify Claim 1 by solving the FPE in (35) numerically using the finite difference method. Here, set e ¼ 0:
Choose the initial positions of the players such that ð * x 0 ; * y 0 Þ ¼ ð1; 1Þ; and y n is determined in (24) . In addition, by (44), let k 2 ¼ v À s 2 =2e ¼ 0:7; and choose constant C as 1=6: The evolution of P y n ðrðx t Þ > eÞ with time by solving the FPE equation is plotted in Figure 4 as well as the analytical upper bound on the right-hand side of (45), which is denoted by P u : The result verifies the claim in (45).
Stochastic PE games with imperfect state information
In this section, PE games with imperfect state information is briefly introduced. We only discuss the difficulty of such problems and suggest a potential suboptimal solution technique. Complete solution still need further investigation in depth.
In games where the players' measurements are imperfect, the information available to each player is no long symmetric, and thus, the information structure can raise fundamental challenges [15, 16, 29] . In general, this is a very difficult problem, and theoretical results in this field are still largely unavailable. To avoid the difficulty in the information structure, we focus on a class of PE problems where pursuers have noisy measurements but evaders can still measure the states perfectly. This represents a worst-case scenario to the pursuers. Under this setting, we may approach the problem by optimization from the pursuers' perspective.
Consider the players' dynamic equation in (2) with (3) and the objective functional in (4). The pursuers' measurement is described by y t ¼ hðx t ; xÞ where y is the measurement, h is the measurement function, and x is the disturbance with known statistics. In addition, since z is a logic state, it is known to the pursuers. Let I p t be the 
On finite expectation of the capture time
Finally, we explore the finite expected capture time of the evader in a two-player game with imperfect state information. A specific model of measurement is used to demonstrate the effect of the measurement accuracy on the capture time of the evader. Consider the two-player PE game in Section 3.4.3. Let x B ¼ ½% x B ; % y B T for B 2 fp; eg: Again, we assume that the evader can measure the states (x p ; x e ) perfectly; while the pursuer knows its own state x p perfectly but can only access a noisy measurement of x e ; which is described by y e ¼ x e þ x e ðx e Þ ð 49Þ
Here, y e is the measurement; x e ðx e Þ is a random vector representing the measurement disturbance.
Since the evader can access the perfect states, we assume that the evader exploits the optimal control y n e determined in (24) . Note that y n e is still optimal here if the pursuer's measurement does not depend on the evader's control input. Suppose that the pursuer calculates its optimal control * y p according to (24) but with the perfect state x e replaced by its measurement y e : Let
: According to (13) , the evolution of r under the controls y n e and * y p can be described as follows:
Note that (50) reduces to (43) when y e ¼ x e : Assume that the disturbance x e is bounded. In the following, we provide a bound X e of x e ; such that if jjx e jj4X e ; % r ¼ 4 Efrjr > eg has a positive decreasing rate.
Construct a co-ordinate system whose origin is the current position of the pursuer. Denote by WðxÞ the angle between the line of sight from the evader to the pursuer and the % x-axis, as illustrated in Figure 5 . In this section, the usefulness of limited look-ahead in the performance enhancement is demonstrated in stochastic co-operative pursuit problems. Consider a simple PE game involving two pursuers and two evaders with the players' dynamics in (19) and the objective in (10), which is the sum of the capture times of all the evaders. Consider a specific scenario, where the players' initial positions and velocities are specified in Table I . Let s Here, we assume that both the pursuers and the evaders can access the state variables perfectly.
We first apply the hierarchical method, where the objective of the optimization problem at the upper level is (11) with the Value function of the distributed two-player games specified in (20) . The resulting optimal engagement is that pursuer 1 (2) is engaged with evader 1 (2) . Under this engagement, the strategies of the pursuers and the evaders are determined by solving the distributed two-player games at the lower level. Typical sample trajectories of co-operative pursuit under such an engagement are shown in Figure 6(a) , where the arrows indicate the expected instantaneous moving directions of the players when the snapshots are taken. We use a circle to indicate the capture range of the pursuer as well as the capture of the corresponding evader inside. Now, let x ¼ ½% x p ; % y p ; % x e ; % y e T and denote by f V h ðx; zÞ the suboptimal upper Value obtained by the hierarchical approach as in (11) . Suppose that the game starts at t 0 : Given Dt > 0; at each sample time t ¼ t 0 þ kDt (k 2 Z 50 ), we implement the optimization based on limited look-ahead as in (9) but with certainty equivalence, i.e. 
where # x tþDt;x t ;a;b½a ¼ 4 Efx tþDt;x t ;a;b½a g: In this example, we choose Dt ¼ 0:1; such that the 'minimax' problem in (54) can be approximated by a static optimization problem with a; b ¼ b½a fixed during Dt intervals. The optimal strategies (a n t ; b n t ) solved are utilized during the next Dt interval. By repetition of this procedure, the trajectories of the players can be generated, and one of the samples is illustrated in Figure 6 (b).
In Figure 6 (b), we draw the dashed arrows to emphasize the players' movement. Clearly, the evolution of the game in Figure 6 (b) can better resemble the reality compared to Figure 6(a) . Specifically, when the players are close, both pursuers can move co-operatively to force the evaders to change their escaping directions. In such a way, the performance is improved. It should be noted here that the trajectories in Figure 6 are sample runs. To further justify the limited look-ahead method, we have simulated the same game 1000 times using both methods, and the average cost (accumulative capture time) according to (10) under the hierarchical STOCHASTIC MULTI-PLAYER PURSUIT-EVASION DIFFERENTIAL GAMES 241 method is 7.79 (s) while it is 6.53 (s) by the limited look-ahead method. Clearly, the performance by the hierarchical approach can be improved by the limited look-ahead method.
Cooperative pursuit game with imperfect state information
In this section, we demonstrate the feasibility of the limited look-ahead approach through a multiplayer stochastic PE game with imperfect state information. Consider a game with three pursuers and three evaders, and the dynamics of the players are given in (19) . The sum of the capture time of each evader is the objective. Assume that the evaders have perfect state measurement; the pursuers can measure their own states perfectly but their measurement of the evaders is noisy. The pursuers' measurement (of evader j) at each time t ¼ 4 t 0 þ kDt is described by In this paper, a general stochastic multi-player PE differential game with additive Gaussian noise in the dynamics has been formulated. To avoid the difficulty of multiplicity of the players in conventional DP methods, a class of suboptimal approaches is specified, such that the resulting suboptimal solution has an improving property based on the optimization with limited look-ahead. A hierarchical method that decomposes a multi-player game into two-player games belongs to the set. Starting from a proper suboptimal solution, the improvement based on limited look-ahead can be applied iteratively and the process converges. Furthermore, we derive an analytical solution for a two-player game using the Dubin's car model, and the conditions on finite expectation of the capture time are specified. The usefulness and the feasibility of limited look-ahead methods are demonstrated through selected simulation scenarios. One appealing advantage of this limited look-ahead approach is that the real pursuers' intentions can be concealed from the evaders' point of view.
The iterative method provides a natural framework to general multi-player (zero-sum) games. However, due to its close relation to DP methods, scalability is an issue. Practical algorithms need further investigation.
APPENDIX A
Lemma 10
Given any aðÁÞ 2 AðtÞ; define 
Note that W a 5 f V for any a 2 AðtÞ; and then by (A3) And (A4), 
